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Soviet Legislation on Cooperatives:
Private Enterprises Within a Non-market
Economy

William G. Frenkel*
The Soviet Union took a major step toward adopting elements of
a free-market decentralized economy with privately-owned means of
production when the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR or Soviet Union), the country's parliament, issued
a Law on Cooperatives on June 1, 1988.' This new, comprehensive
legislation makes dramatic changes in the domestic economy, (1) by
legitimizing certain private companies doing business as cooperatives
(dubbed "socialist cooperative enterprises," but endowed with unmistakable features of Western business corporations); and (2) by
introducing independent planning into certain sectors of the failing
economic infrastructure previously characterized by rigid and bureaucratic central planning. 2
* Associate, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, New York, N.Y.; B.A. Baruch College
of the City University of New York; J.D., cum laude, New York Law School. Mr. Frenkel
was born and resided in the Soviet Union until 1979 and became a United States citizen in
1986. His practice specializes in corporate and international trade and investment law, with
an emphasis on advising U.S. companies doing business in the USSR and Eastern Europe.
Mr. Frenkel is a member of the Soviet and East European Law Committee of the New York
State Bar Association and has published numerous articles on Soviet foreign direct investment
legislation and business opportunities for American firms in the Soviet Union.
The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable contributions of John I. Huhs, Esq. and
George M. Williams, Jr., Esq. of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae for their expert advice
and editorial assistance. The author also expresses gratitude to Hon. Anatoly P. Belov of the
USSR Ministry of Justice for providing the official Russian text of the Law on Cooperatives.
1. See VED. VEReH. Soy. SSSR (Bul. Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR), No. 22, Item 355 (June
1, 1988).
2. Decentralization also has occurred in the public sector, where a part of the national
economy acquired the right to exercise substantial freedom in planning, pricing, and distribution
of its production under contract in addition to its operations pursuant to the state orders. See
Law on State Enterprises, art. 19, VED. VERKH. Soy. SSSR, No. 26, Item 385 (June 30, 1987).
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The Law on Cooperatives comes only one year after the enactment
of the Joint Venture Law,' which was highly publicized in the West
and which stimulated renewed commercial relations with the Soviet
Union. 4 Although the Law on Cooperatives primarily addresses the
questions of private business development within the USSR by Soviet
nationals, it should be of interest to Western businesses and lawyers
for several important reasons. First, cooperative enterprises are, in
many instances, given the right to consummate commercial transactions with Western companies without the intermediation of Soviet
foreign trade organizations or other governmental agencies.' Second,
cooperative enterprises also are empowered to be the Soviet partners
in joint ventures with companies from capitalist countries in lieu of
the Soviet governmental bodies and state enterprises. 6 Finally, the
presence of privately held cooperative enterprises in the Soviet market
provides a novel alternative to Western firms doing business in the
USSR. The cooperatives function both as suppliers and consumers
of goods and services, threatening the monopoly of the state-owned
enterprises and state industrial and agricultural ministries. The unexpected competition with the state industrial giants generated by the
advent of small, flexible, and independently managed and privatelyowned companies is apparently a major ingredient in Gorbachev's
prescription for treatment of the Soviet economic backwardness and
gradual decay. The success of the Soviet cooperative movement is
vital to Gorbachev's policy of perestroika (restructuring). 7
As outlined by Gorbachev and his aides, cooperatives are supposed
to assist in fulfilling the following goals of the current Soviet reform:
(1) meeting demand in consumer goods, services, and housing; (2)
raising the standard of living in the Soviet Union generally; (3)
increasing labor productivity and quality of production; (4) providing
work for those workers who may be unemployed after liquidation
of unprofitable state enterprises; and (5) securing the innovation and

3. Decree No. 49 on Joint Enterprises of January 13, 1987 reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 749
(1987). See also, Viehe, Joint-Ventures in the Soviet Union Regime-Boom or Bust, I
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 181 (1988).
4. See generally Carpenter and Smith, U.S.-Soviet Joint Ventures: A New Opening in
the East, 43 Bus. LAw. 79 (1987); Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law: Analysis, Issues,
and Approachesfor the American Investor, 19 LAw & PO'Y IN INT'L Bus. 851 (1988).
5. See Law on Cooperatives, art. 28, § 2, (W. Frenkel trans. 1988), to be reprinted in
forthcoming vol. 28 I.L.M. (1989) [hereinafter Law on Cooperatives].
6. See id. § 4.
7. See Kurtzman, Of Perestroika, Prices and Pessimism, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1988, §
3, at 1, col. 2.
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initiative necessary to develop high technology industries., Private
enterprise, as embodied in the Soviet version of a cooperative, is
expected to facilitate achievement of these plans by the use of
conventional profit motives 9 and the self-interest of the cooperatives'
owners. The size and flexibility of small cooperative ventures is
considered critical for fostering creativity and innovation.10 Additionally, cooperatives are expected to play a role in Gorbachev's macroeconomic plans by bridging the gap between the current Soviet
economy (a producer of raw materials and exploiter of natural
resources) and the future Soviet economy (which will be an industrial
and high-technology society competing in global markets for goods
and services)."
I.

HISTORY OF THE SOVIET COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT AND PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE IN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Since the Communist Revolution in 1917, the basic socialist structure of public ownership and control of basic factors of production
(by means of central planning exercised by governmental agencies)
suppressed most forms of private ownership of business.12 Economic
life was declared to be essentially public, and not private, in character. 13 Monopolistic state ownership is established in the Constitution
of the USSR (Constitution), which declares the earth, its resources,
water, and forests to be the "exclusive" property of the state. 4 Also,
the Constitution vests in the state "nonexclusive" ownership of the
basic means of production, the property of commercial enterprises,
and other forms of property. 15 From the early days of the new social
order, however, the Soviet government has made exceptions to the
prohibition of private business ownership or simply acquiesced to its

8. See Keller, Gorbachev Asks the Party to Give Voters Some Power and Lessen
Economic Reigns, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1988, at Al, col. 4. See also Gumbel, Soviet Union
Plans to Let EntrepreneursFill Gap Left by the Creaky State Sector, Wall St. J., Dec. 12,

1988, at A9, col. 1.
9.

In Soviet terminology, this transformation is to be accomplished by turning to

"economic" methods of management from "administrative" methods, thus connoting a
transition to a less centralized system of management and planning. See AOANREGYAN, THE
ECONOMIC CHALLENGE OF PEREsTRoIKA 26-27 (1988).

10. Id. at 129.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 99-100.
See BERMAN, JusaicE in Tim USSR 155 (1962).
Id.

14. KoNsr. OsNo. ZAK. SSSR (Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics), art. 11 (1977).
15. Id. Nonexclusive form of state ownership allows collective farms, cooperatives, and
other socialist organizations or enterprises to formally own certain property. Id. art. 12.
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manifestations. Cooperative ownership was perhaps one of the earliest
compromises made by the Soviet state in an attempt to reconcile its
ideology with the economic realities of contemporary industrial society.
The history of the cooperative movement in the Soviet Union can

be traced to the early 1920s, when cooperatives were organized on a
pattern inherited from the European cooperative movement, which
had extended into the Russian Empire. 16 Initially, the cooperatives

in the USSR resembled typical western cooperatives in that they were
voluntary associations of individuals who joined by contributing
capital and labor and enjoyed the benefits of cooperation in the form
of profits paid out to members or kept in the business. 1 7 Later,
however, the state's interest in the cooperatives' performance forcibly
did away with the key feature of voluntarism. Soviet cooperatives

soon lost their autonomy, selection of management became a function
of the state, production and pricing became subject to central planning, and the areas of business activity were almost exclusively

confined to agriculture.'

Private ownership in cooperatives almost

lost nearly all importance during the reign of Stalin. 19 During the

1960s and 1970s, cooperative forms expanded somewhat from collective farms to urban housing and certain service areas, but the
Soviet government resisted allowing cooperatives to regain a decidedly
20
private form of industrial enterprise.
The Law on Cooperatives introduced by Gorbachev's administra-

tion is but a single step in the Soviet attempt at thorough economic
reform. Private business activity never completely ceased in the Soviet

Union and, for the most part, took the form of semi-legal activities
on the black market. 2' The Soviets have recently acknowledged the
16. See PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND CoMPARATIVE LAW, THm SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM
278-79 (J. Hazard, W. Butler, & P. Maggs 3d ed. 1977).
17. Id. at 279-80.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. The extent of the "second economy," the underground economic sector populated by
retail store employees, black marketeers, common criminals and government officials, has been
estimated to provide 1.5 billion roubles worth of services-3.5 percent of the country's totalby the Central Statistical Administration. See Pravda, June 26, 1987, at 2, col. 1. Another
Soviet government source at Gosplan (the Soviet state planning agency), estimated that the
Soviet Union's black market economy has a turnover of about 90 billion roubles a year. See
Fin. Times, Aug. 13, 1988, at 1, col. 1. Basically, the system under Brezhnev and his
predecessors facilitated the growth of the "second economy" by subsidizing Soviet prices for
many scarce goods, or by creating a system of special stores for the Soviet elite (i.e., party
members and show business people) thus encouraging black marketeers and the general public
to resell them at higher prices. See HOUGH, RussIA AND THE WEST: GORBACHEV AND THE
POLITICS OF REFORM 99 (1988).
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gigantic dimensions of the underground economy within their territory,22 and the Supreme Soviet on November 19, 1986, counteracted

by enacting a law permitting people employed in the state sector to
earn money privately in their spare time in a number of occupations.3
In February 1987, a new law permitted creation of cooperatives to
produce industrial goods from recycled materials.24 By that time,
cooperatives were being widely established despite the absence of

comprehensive legislation. With the prospect of the June 1, 1988
Law on Cooperatives, however, the transformation was nearly com-

plete and the concept of a privately held company with the stylistic
modifications necessary to integrate it into the Marxist-Leninist line
of thinking was legalized.
The legitimization of private enterprise in the USSR is a significant

milestone in the current reform. Previous leaders preferred to accept
black markets, corruption, and economic inefficiency rather than to
legalize private activity and allow business income and affluence in
a society purportedly based on equality and egalitarianism. Acceptance of private activity could occur only in the days of glasnost,

(openness) when the pragmatically-minded leadership could no longer
afford to slow the tempo of the economic restructuring it had

undertaken. Economic profit as a criterion of performance has
acquired a new meaning in the times of perestroika and has lost
many of its negative connotations in the official government rhetoric.

It would certainly be naive to assume that the Soviet Union is
being transformed into anything like a capitalist economy. 5 In de-

22. See

AOAmEGYAN, supra note 9, at 26.
23. See Izvestiia, Nov. 20, 1986, at 5; FBIS, Nov. 26, 1986, at S1. Many Soviet citizens,
particularly those active in the "second economy," showed a reluctance to legalize their
business ventures because of their distaste for taxation and expensive business licenses. The
law on unearned income which was passed in Summer 1986 specifically targeted this group of
tax-dodgers; and, rather than exhibiting Moscow's hostility toward private labor and trade,
the law was a rational step in suppressing the illegal "second economy." See HouGH, supra
note 21, at 193-94. The key legal requirement of the legislation on individual labor activity
consists of registration with the local Soviet of all such labor activity except certain creative
activity in the sciences, technology, literature, art, and de minimis or one-time work assignments. Certain enumerated activities require a patent or a license for a person to perform the
service. Where a patent must be issued, an annual lump-sum fee is payable to the local Soviet
for the right to operate and the patent holder is then exempt from income tax normally
imposed on private labor activity. The legislation also contains lists of approved and prohibited
activities. The applicant often will be required to meet minimum standards of education,
training, or proficiency. See BtrrLR, SoviET LAw 241 (1988).
24. BUTLER, supra note 23, at 241.
25. To speak of pure capitalism or pure socialism is to vastly simplify the economic state
of affairs prevalent in the West and the East. When the Soviets refer to the American economic
system as capitalist, they disregard many important developments of this century. The U.S.
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scribing the final product of the current restructuring, the Soviets

not only refer to their economy, management, and cooperatives as
"socialist," but also, they use the terms "free market" and "profit
orientation" with meanings seemingly different from normal western
usage. 26 Certainly, pervasive government regulation and control, be

it centralized or local, can be expected even in the most liberal
versions of the Soviet vision of a restructured economy. Conversely,
it is not inconceivable that the USSR may successfully adopt private
enterprise into its own political and economic systems. The effect
that a new private business sector would have on the Soviet economy,

and the Soviet society in general, is difficult to predict now without
a fair amount of speculation.
II.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOVIET COOPERATIVES UNDER THE LAW ON
COOPERATIVES

The legal framework for forming and managing Soviet cooperative
enterprises does not vary substantially from a typical American
corporation statute. 27 The concept of an American cooperative association or corporation is even closer to that of a Soviet cooperative
enterprise. In fact, many United States cooperatives in practice

resemble the Soviet form of cooperative businesses to a much greater
extent than United States business corporations. Although in American law a cooperative association organized in corporate form is
basically a corporation and is treated as such, 2 cooperative associa-

government actively engages in various commercial activities, and countless governmental
administrative agencies and public corporations have been given pervasive control over private
business activities. Taxation became an instrument of public policy and many regulated
industries became virtually nationalized. On the other hand, the Soviet economy is a money
economy. Profits are an important incentive for directors and employees of many state
enterprises and many traditional aspects of property and contract retain their importance.
Restrictions on private ownership are, therefore, only relatively more prohibitive in the USSR
than in the West, no matter how different the two systems might appear. Lastly, any progress
made by the Soviets in granting their citizens more freedom to own property and to contract
should be deemed significant. See Bn~msAN, JusTicE rN mH USSR 153-54 (1963).
26. See Hofheinz, Stalinist Economy Proves Hard to Dislodge, Fin. Times, Jan. 3, 1989,
at 14, col. 1.
27. In fact, the words "corporation" and "cooperation" have a similar character, and
in theory a Soviet cooperative could have much in common with a small American corporation,
depending on how entry and withdrawal from the cooperative is handled and the ease with
which one can be established. See HOUGH, supra note 21, at 194. See also N.Y. Corporations
Law § I et seq. (McKinney 1988 Supp.).
28. See In re Wisconsin Co-operative Milk Pool, 119 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 655 (1941). Although most U.S. cooperatives are incorporated either under
general business laws or under statutes particularly applicable to cooperatives or under nonprofit or voluntary corporation statutes, "[ijncorporation is neither an indispensable nor a
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tions may be generally distinguished from other business structures
by the features of democratic control and voting, the distribution of
economic benefits on an equal basis or in proportion to the use
made of the association facilities, limited return on capital, and the
fact that the associations may transact business with their own
members. 29 As described below, Soviet cooperatives possess many of
these features,3 0 and, for political reasons, democratic elements in
the management of cooperatives and distribution of profits hold
much appeal for Soviet legislative drafters. Moreover, the form of a
cooperative association for Soviet private businesses was apparently
not incidental, for it emphasized collective labor and self-management
while striking a convenient compromise between its private ownership
31
and the socialist economy.
The principal difference between the Soviet decree and American
corporate statutes is that the Soviet law is rather sketchy and lacking
in detail. The drafters of the Soviet decree were seemingly more
preoccupied with concepts and ideals than with rules and procedures.
Lack of general corporate and private commercial activity in the
country also affected the language of the statute, 32 as did the apparent

significant mark of the cooperative." See 18 AM. JuiR. 2d Corporations § I, at 274 (1985).
The profit motive, however, distinguishes cooperative associations from "eleemosynary or
charitable organizations," even though some of them are organized for the mutual benefit of
their members, without gain to the entity. Id. § 2, at 275.
29. See Lambert v. Fisherman's Dock Cooperative, Inc., 115 N.J. Super. App. Div. 424,
280 A.2d 193 (1971), modified, 61 N.J. 596, 297 A.2d 566 (1972). See also 18 Am. JuR. 2d
Corporations§ 2, at 275 (1985).
30. See infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text.
31. The preferred form of non-state or private activity was to be the cooperative, because
the Party saw in it an opportunity to revitalize the economy with private economic activity
while engendering the least threat to socialist values. When, in February 1987, the Politburo
endorsed a broader program of cooperatives, Gorbachev insisted that Lenin was, above all,
interested in "cooperative socialism." The government's call to return to Lenin's precedent
has long been supported by reformers in Soviet economic academia, who advocate a return
to Lenin's New Economic Policy, with its legitimization of the market and small private
enterprise. See GOLDMAN, ECONOMIC REFopM IN THE AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 82-83 (1987).
32. Soviet reformists are now facing the enormous task of developing private law jurisprudence and establishing new institutions for the settlement of private commercial disputes
as the country gears up for increased domestic and foreign private business activity. The
transition from a "command economy" into what is now termed in the Soviet Union a
management economy requires new legislation in areas never envisioned by the Soviet drafters
before Gorbachev. The civil codes of the Soviet republics have been rewritten twice in the
past to eradicate all provisions for private enterprise, and may be in direct conflict with the
new federal legislation authorizing cooperatives. As regards pure corporation law, the last
vestiges of company law, which provided for joint stock companies, were abolished in 1962.
The relations between business partners and the claims of their creditors are in a legal limbo
for lack of partnership, agency, and bankruptcy or insolvency law. Soviet lawyers also recognize
that a revival of private enterprise will require protection of intellectual and industrial property,
fair trade rules, restrictive practices legislation, consumer protection, and rules governing
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cautious desire of the drafters not to deviate too far from the precepts
of Soviet ideology.3 3 The principal provisions of the Law on Coop-

eratives regarding the status, formation, and activities of cooperatives
are examined in greater detail below.
A.

Status of a Soviet Cooperative: Its Powers and Relations to

the State
As a legal corporate or juridical entity, a cooperative enterprise

may: (1) own property such as buildings, machinery, equipment, and
means of transportation; (2) maintain bank accounts, incur obligations, and issue securities; (3) conduct commercial transactions with
other cooperatives, state enterprises, and private individuals on whole-

sale or retail level; (4) market and distribute its production; (5)
employ workers, officers, and agents; and (6) sue in a court of law,
or arbitrate.3 4 The law places special emphasis on the features which
characterize the independence of cooperative business activities such
as self-financing, cost-accounting, and protection of the cooperative's
property and interests under the law. 35 The corporate feature of
limited liability also has been accorded to the Soviet cooperative in
that cooperative members are not liable for the obligations and debts
of the cooperative, and only the cooperative's property can be

liability for defective products. Even antitrust legislation is now contemplated, based upon the
model of the European Community's competition department, as a means of containing
multinationals. See Herman, Gorbachev's Search for the Rule of Law, Fin. Times, June 20,
1988, at 20, col. 3.
33. Ideological problems are extremely difficult to overcome because Soviet law technically
does not recognize private ownership of the means of production. The various civil codes
protect the property of state enterprises against all infringement and the property of cooperatives
against al except the state. Accommodating the requirements of the new style management
economy, however, cannot be done without legitimizing some form of ownership of assets
and the possibility of offering these as security to creditors. See Herman, supra note 32. The
Law on Cooperatives stops short of unambiguous recognition of the right to own all means
of production, carving out a little niche for the private ownership of cooperative enterprises.
This exception is, nevertheless, significant in legitimizing at least limited forms of private
industrial ownership in the Soviet Union due to the lack of any historic precedent for it since
the experiment in the 1920s with the New Economic Policy. Vestiges of conservative Soviet
thinking are unfortunately still present in the Law on Cooperatives; for example, a provision
of the law describing the labor force of a cooperative refers to the communist party organization
within the cooperative, which is said to "facilitate the industrial initiative and social activeness
of the cooperative's members" acting "within the framework of the USSR Constitution." See
Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 6, § 3. The drafters of that section apparently felt
that old-fashioned incentives, such as dividends for shareholders and bonuses for employees,
were insufficient to make them feel responsible for the business results of their activities.
34. Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 7, § 1; art. 8, § 3.
35. Id. arts. 6, 8, 20.
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attached to satisfy the cooperative's corporate obligations. 36 Structural
subdivisions within a cooperative are expressly permissible and coopworks, and farms, as
eratives may form divisions, plants, factories,
37
well as branches and representative offices.
Soviet constitutional law traditionally speaks of two kinds of
socialist ownership (state ownership and cooperative ownership) 38 and
one kind of nonsocialist ownership (personal ownership) 39 which is
basically limited to consumer goods and housing. Thus, the cooperative form of ownership and means of conducting business is not a
novel concept in Soviet law. The powers that have been granted to,
and allowed to be exercised by, the new Soviet cooperatives, however,
make the Soviet cooperatives of the 1980s stand out from the
background of the Soviet jurisprudential dogma of state ownership.
Until now, neither cooperative nor personal forms of property affected the economic structure of the Soviet society because production, distribution, and sales were all controlled by state agencies
rather than by consumer demand. The monopolistic element of the
state economy undoubtedly will remain a primary feature of the
Soviet economy in the near future. The cooperative form of ownership, however, has the potential for a vastly expanded role in the
national economy, subject, of course, to relaxed administrative controls.
Many of the corporate privileges newly granted to cooperatives
represent a serious ideological shift from the norms of Soviet society,
particularly the right to employ others and to exercise economic and
financial independence from state agencies. 4° The revival of limited
36. Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 8, § 4. Cooperative members may be liable
for a cooperative's obligations if the charter so provides or where legislation on the national
or republic level so provides. Presumably, personal guarantees of cooperative members also
would create liability. The state bears no liability whatsoever for the cooperative's obligations,
since cooperative enterprises are not state-owned. Id.
37. Id. art. 5, § 4.

38.

KoNsr. OsNo. ZAK. SSSR (Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics), arts. 11, 12 (1977).
39. Id. art. 13.
40. To date, Soviet law is still fraught with internal inconsistencies and contradictions as
to the legality of many cooperative activities now permitted by the Law on Cooperatives. For
instance, the Soviet Penal Code still prescribes punishment for the crime of "speculation"
which Article 154 defines as the "buying up and resale of goods or other items for the purpose
of making a profit." More importantly, Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution provides that
"the land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rails, water and air
transport, banks, post, telegraph and telephones, large state-organized agricultural enterprises
(state farms, machine and tractor stations, and the like) as well as municipal enterprises and
the bulk of the dwelling houses in the cities and industrial localities comprise state ownership,
that belong to the whole people." The effect of Article 6 seems to exclude the enumerated
items from private or cooperative ownership by removing publicly owned property from private
commerce. See BERmAN, supra note 12, at 114-15.
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private enterprise comes after a long hiatus during which the Soviets
had no experience with private ownership of enterprises other than
through illicit activities on the black market. 41 Obviously, many Soviet
ideologists are very resistant to parting with the fundamentals of
Soviet Marxism-Leninism, and are wary of the potential that cooperatives have for amassing political and economic power. 42 To respond
to attacks from some government agencies trying to tax excessively
and regulate private enterprise, and from the general Soviet public,
which is jealous and contemptuous of the personal success stories of
entrepreneurs, the budding private sector has generated a number of
special interest groups. 43 These associations of cooperatives have been
organized to unite against threats to the cooperatives' prosperity,
and, some fear, to their very existence. While political lobbying
remains the major activity of these associations, they also work to
defend Soviet private businesses against obstructive government bureaucrats, envious professional rivals, criminal racketeers, and an
increasingly hostile public in a variety of ways, including the organization of public seminars and various mass media efforts. 44
Some reformers, nevertheless, are painfully blunt about the necessity of offering radical political, economic, and social change, even
though some of the elements of the reform may come dangerously
close to copying capitalist economic systems long abhorred by orthodox Soviet Communist Party members. 4 The law attempts to strike

41. A notable exception occurred in the early 1920s when Lenin allowed some entrepreneurs
to rebuild the country after the civil war under the policies of NEP. All private business was
eliminated a few years later by Stalin.
42. Many Soviets, from economists to lay people, are antagonistic toward the cooperatives,
attacking them and the enabling law for "taking the capitalist road." They criticize the
cooperative movement for its get-rich-quick tactics, putting inflated prices on scarce goods (a
widespread practice in the USSR, condemned as "speculation" or "profiteering"), and
particularly for the cooperative's right to employ contract labor, seen by some Soviets as
exploitation of the working class. See Soviet Cooperatives, Risky Business, Fin. Times, Aug.
3, 1988, at 2, col. I.
43. It appears that such lobbying work has been largely successful with the government
in the case of the law authorizing a 90% tax on cooperative profits proposed by the Finance
Ministry in Summer 1988 which was later revoked when the Ministry relented to private
entrepreneurs, who flooded the party and the Government with telegrams. Public attitudes
remain rather hostile toward cooperatives, which are ready scapegoats for problems that used
to be blamed on corrupt government or political intrigues. See Keller, Private Entrepreneurs,
Under Fire, Try Closing Ranks, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1988, at Al, col. 3.
44. Id.
45. For instance, Vadim A. Medvedev, who became the Soviet Communist Party's chief
ideologist in the realignment of the Kremlin leadership, in a speech published in Moscow,
called for "a new conception of socialism," noting that other political and economic systems,
including capitalism, hold valuable lessons for the Soviet Union. See New Soviet Aide Says
Capitalism Offers Lessons, L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
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a balance between orthodox and reformist thinking and retains a
small number of the Soviet dogmas thought of as untouchable taboos
by the government. For example, one of the limitations on the
powers of a cooperative is that it cannot own land and other natural
resources, but must lease them from the state. 4 Another important
limitation is found in the requirement that members or shareholders
of the cooperative cannot be passive investors of capital but must
actively participate in cooperative activities, although apparently such
equity holders may occupy managerial or directorial positions which
require only minimal personal involvement. 47 The Law on Cooperatives places no restrictions on the business activities of cooperativesany activity is permissible unless it is expressly forbidden by other
4
Soviet federal or republic law. 1
Theoretically, cooperatives may be formed and operated in all
branches of industry, agriculture, trade, and social and cultural
endeavors. Six months after the enactment of the Law on Cooperatives, however, the Soviet Council of Ministers published without
public debate a decree limiting certain cooperative activities. Among
the banned activities are a wide range of medical services, schools
and educational facilities, video production, publication of books on
art, science, and literature, and the manufacture and sale of religious
items. Another range of activities is allowed only where a cooperative
is working under a contract with a state enterprise. These include all
remaining publishing activities, organizing and promoting concerts
and other forms of entertainment, and foreign tourist operations.
The leaders of the Soviet cooperative movement have already
expressed concern about repercussions which the new restrictions may
have on the image of cooperatives from the perspective of foreign
partners looking for stable business relationships. Government officials have defended the decree by pointing to the substandard services
offered by some cooperatives and to the need for regulation to
protect the public. The biggest impact of the new restrictions is
anticipated to be in the area of medical services, which is the fastest
growing cooperative sector, and video productions, which require
substantial investment in hard currency.
In contrast, the drafters of the statute apparently set their sights
quite high with regard to the future of cooperatives. The law even

46. See Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 7.

47. See id. art. 6, § 7.
48. See id. art. 3, § 1.
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envisions establishment of cooperative banks49 and insurance companies. In practice, though, service areas such as restaurants, cafes,

repair shops, laundries, retail stores, local crafts shops, and small
factories predominate. 0 The impact of these business entrants, however, has already affected Soviet consumers as well as the state
treasury via tax revenues. Moscow, Leningrad, and the Caucasian

and Baltic republics have engendered the largest number of cooperatives.5 1 Furthermore, new types of cooperatives spring up every day:

from professional associations of lawyers, accountants, economists,
engineers, and physicians to high technology research and production
facilities in electronics, computers, and biomedical research, as well

as trading cooperatives specializing in export-import business and
2
barter transactions.5
49. The state's banking monopoly was broken by the first cooperative bank to be formed
in the Soviet Union, in the Central Asian city of Chimkent. Soyuzbank is a bank registered
with Gosbank, the Soviet State Bank, and has an authorized capital of 1 million roubles and
the right to accept 20 million roubles in deposits from enterprises and the general public.
Western analysts expect the role of banking to grow in the Soviet Union as the concept of
enterprises as self-supporting or private units operating for profit take root under the Kremlin's
economic reforms, and displace government banks, which have until now only overseen the
performance of enterprises and subsidized their losses, being uninterested in boosting profits
and expanding banking services. See Soviet Reformers Chip Away At State Banking Monopoly,
Reuter Bus. Rep., Aug. 29, 1988. Cooperatives have experienced great difficulties in obtaining
credits from state banks, and cooperative banks, which have expanded to a number of other
cities, will provide an improved and enlarged system of banking for the private sector of the
Soviet economy. See First Soviet CooperativeBank Set Up, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 2, 1988.
50. More than a third provide various types of domestic services, an area particularly
neglected by the state, over 5,000 are in catering, over 7,000 make some form of consumer
goods, 5,640 offer transport, sports and other facilities, and over 1,600 use the waste or
discarded equipment from plants in some form of recycling process. See Lloyd, Soviet Cooperatives Take Off In A Big Way, Fin. Times, Aug. 23, 1988, at 2, col. 1.
51. Just over half (16,324, with revenues of 528 million roubles) are in the Russian
Republic. See Lloyd, supra note 50, at 2, col. 1. Moscow has in excess of 3,000 cooperative
enterprises, which claim combined revenues for the first half of 1987 of 100 million roubles.
See Lloyd, Soviet Co-ops Strain At The Bonds of State, Fin. Times, Aug. 11, 1988, at 2, col.
4. The Ukraine has 5,269, with revenues of 151.8 million roubles. The republics of Byelorussia,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Gruzia have more than 1,000 each. "The small but entrepreneurial
Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have respectively 609, 540, and 917." Id.
52. Typically, a Soviet high-tech start-up company is formed through the initiative of
former state employees at research institutes, who assemble a small group of production
specialists, engineers, and computer scientists, and design a unique product to fill a market
niche. Unlike the bureaucratic and inflexible state enterprises or institutes, small co-ops can
get a product into the manufacturing stage in months. Most of the cooperative's employees
are in production and are paid double and triple the typical Soviet worker's wage. See
Galuszka, Soviet Technology, Bus. WK., Nov. 7, 1988, at 68-78.
With the ingenuity typical of American businesses, one Moscow cooperative opened its doors
to potential managers and owners of future cooperatives, rendering services akin to a U.S.
venture capital or management consulting firm, ranging from legal, management, and marketing
consulting to financial aid and information networking capacity. Equipped with the name
"Fakt," two IBM personal computers, and a staff of about 100 professionals, this cooperative
has been grossing 180,000 roubles (approximately $300,000 at the official rate of exchange)
monthly.
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The law distinguishes between "industrial" and "consumer" coop-

eratives. Industrial cooperatives are enterprises engaged in the manufacture of goods, agricultural production, services, the professions
of law, medicine, accounting, engineering, and architecture, and the

production of other tangible and intangible output.5 3 Consumer coop-

eratives satisfy the needs and interests of their members and improve

their daily lives much the same as Western residential housing coop-

eratives and consumer buyers' associations.5 4 Cooperatives are authorized also to be of the "mixed" type, that is, having features of

both industrial and consumer cooperatives. 5 5 A special provision in

the law also allows cooperatives to take over state enterprises, pri-

vatize them, and run them more efficiently, essentially in a Soviet
version of a leveraged buyout.5 6 The corporate structure of large

cooperatives may be as complex as that of large corporate conglomerates because the law allows creating unions and associations of

cooperatives so that smaller cooperative enterprises may band together and develop stronger market, research, and development potential.17
B.

Formation of a Cooperative Enterprise,Its Charter, and
Liquidation
A cooperative enterprise is formed by a minimum of three

individuals 58 over the age of sixteen 9 who, strictly on a voluntary
basis, undertake to form a cooperative. No special permission of any
governmental agency is necessary, 60 but the cooperative's charter must

be registered with the local Executive Committee of the Soviet of
People's Deputies. 6 1 Once the charter is registered, the corporate

53. Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 3, § 2.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. art. 29, § 3. This provision allows cooperatives to take over failing state enterprises
because of their insolvency or poor business or financial records, and in the instances
enumerated in the Article 23 of the Law on State Enterprises. Short of taking over the entire
enterprise, cooperatives may also acquire or lease separate plants, divisions, operations, or
property of the state enterprises. Id.
57. Id. art. 16, §§ 1, 2.
58. Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 11, § 1. The law also allows other corporate
entities, such as other cooperatives, state enterprises, and public organizations, to become
members of a cooperative, if that membership would not contradict the present law or the
cooperative's charter. See id. art. 12, § 1.
59. Any Soviet citizen appears to be eligible for membership in cooperatives unless the
federal or republican Soviet law imposes some disability. Id.
60. Id. art. 11, § 1.
61. Id.
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existence of the cooperative enterprise begins.6 2 Mindful of the op-

position to the cooperative movement in local party bureaucracies,
particularly in distant regions of the Soviet Union, the drafters of
the statute provided various mechanisms for appealing the refusal of
a local government to register a new cooperative charter. 63 Abuses
by local governments, often widely reported in the Soviet press,64
have been flagrant nevertheless. Moreover, judicial remedies have
been only a modicum of assistance.
The contents of a cooperative's charter include a basic outline of
its business purposes (very important in light of the strict application

of the ultra vires doctrine in Soviet law), 65 procedures for becoming
a member or investor, management mechanisms (such as voting,
powers and authority of directors and officers, and their administrative competence), procedures for distributing profits, and conditions
for reorganization and liquidation. 66 Any other terms not in conflict
with the statute also may be included. 67 In practice, therefore, the

charter is an amalgam of corporate articles of incorporation and bylaws, embodying the chief constitutive or organizational corporate
document. Any amendments and modifications to the charter also

must be registered after having been approved by the general assembly
6
of the members of the cooperative enterprise. 1

62. Id. art. 11, § 2.
63. For instance, the Executive Committee has 30 days to render its decision as to whether
it will register the applicant's charter. See Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 11, § 4. If
the Executive Committee fails to do so, an applicant may file a complaint with the superior
Executive Committee, Autonomous Republic's Council of Ministers, or Republican's Council
of Ministers, and the complaint must be reviewed within fifteen days. Id. All Executive
Committees are further instructed by the law to refuse registration of only those charters which
do not comply with the present law. In the event a local Executive Committee timely rejects
a submitted charter for some reason, the applicant may then appeal that refusal to the higher
standing Executive Committee, the Republican's Council of Ministers, or a court of law, each
of which is required to review appeals within 30 days. See id. art. 11, § 7.
64. See Kirkland, Why Russia Is Still In The Red, FORTUNE, Jan. 30, 1989, at 173-175.
65. The civil codes of the various Soviet republics provide that a legal person shall have
the capacity to have civil rights and obligations only in accordance with the purposes of its
activities as established by its charter. See, e.g., GK RSFSR (Civil Code) arts. 25-26. Moreover,
a contract or other transaction concluded by a legal person which contradicts the purposes
indicated in its charter is invalid, and its invalidity relates back to the time it was concluded.
Id. arts. 50, 59. The sanction for entering into any ultra vires transaction may be restitution
of its money equivalent or even forfeiture to the state in certain instances. Id. arts. 48, 49.
This draconian sanction of forfeiture has apparently never been applied to a foreign trade
transaction, but in domestic commercial operations forfeiture and a number of criminal
sanctions, which may be applicable to a Soviet party entering into an ultra vires transaction,
continue to be of utmost importance. See BERMAN & BUsTN, The Soviet System of Foreign
Trade, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 987, 1016-17 (1975).
66. Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 11, § 5.
67. Id.
68. Id. art. 11, § 6.
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There are two ways in which the corporate existence of a cooperative may cease: voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary dissolution
may occur upon reorganization through merger with another entity
or upon liquidation pursuant to the decision of the cooperative's
general assembly. 69 Involuntary dissolution may occur by order of
the Executive Committee of the Soviet of People's Deputies in the
event of the cooperative's insolvency, default, or multiple willful and
malicious violations of the law.70 Within three months of its issuance,
the decision may be appealed to a superior Executive Committee,
the republican Council of Ministers, or a court of law.7 1 The statute
does not provide for any specific rules or procedures governing the
property and simply refers
distribution of the liquidated cooperative's
72
Code.
Civil
Soviet
general
to the
C. Constituencies of a Cooperative and Their Statutory Rights
and Liabilities
The principal constituencies of a Soviet cooperative include its
members (who may be owners, nonpassive investors, or shareholders
depending on the form of a given cooperative, e.g., stock or nonstock cooperative), management (which, in the case of larger enterprises, may include a board of directors, a chairperson of the board,
its appointed officers and committees; and in the case of smaller
cooperatives, simply the chairman of the cooperative) and employees.
The law envisions for cooperatives a somewhat traditional corporate
structure where management functions are performed by a board of
directors answerable to the cooperative's members or shareholders
and implemented by various officers and committees.7 3 For smaller
cooperatives, as it is for small closely-held U.S. corporations, this
structure may be modified to permit management functions to be
performed by a single chairperson or members of the cooperative. 74
The general assembly is not unlike a shareholders' meeting in a
U.S. corporation, where the members, shareholders, or owners of

69. Id. art. 15, § 1.
70. Id. art. 15, § 2.
71. Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 15, § 2.
72. The Soviet Union presently does not have bankruptcy laws, although Soviet jurists
have recently noted the possibility of enacting bankruptcy and insolvency legislation. See supra
note 32 and accompanying text.

73. But see infra note 75 and accompanying text (describing some of the ways in which
the corporate structure of the Soviet cooperative enterprise differs from that of an American

business corporation).
74.

See generally O'NEAL & THompsoN, O'NEAL's CLOSE CORP. § 3.12 (3rd ed. 1986).
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the cooperative act on the questions concerning their investment in
the cooperative and central business concerns relating to its activities
and operations. 75 In the Law on Cooperatives, however, "general

assembly" refers to the group composed of members and shareholders. Each member is entitled to one vote, regardless of the extent of
their investment contribution. 76 An interesting feature of the Soviet
cooperative's general assembly is that cooperative employees are given

certain limited rights to vote and to participate in the management
77
of the enterprise on a par with cooperative members or owners.
The general assembly adopts the charter, elects the board of directors

(the administrative decision-making body in the cooperative), elects
the chairperson and other officers (including the audit commission),
and addresses a host of other business concerns. These concerns
include the amount of initial member capital contribution, declaration
78
of profits, mergers, reorganizations, and liquidations.
The board of directors is empowered to make all decisions not
reserved to the authority of the general assembly of cooperative
members, 79 and together with the officers, it performs the executive
function. The chairperson of the cooperative must occupy the position

of the chairperson of the board. 80 The board generally has the power
75. Technically, the general assembly is the supreme management body in a cooperative
(see Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 14, § 2), contrary to the traditional U.S. corporate
law, pursuant to which the board of directors holds this position. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 7, § 141 (1974) ("the business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as otherwise may
be provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation"). Apparently,. though, the
drafters of the law meant "management" in the general sense of the term as it may be used
in U.S. corporate law when applied to shareholders' rights. Upon closer inspection of the
enumerated powers of cooperative members, it appears that like U.S. shareholders, Soviet
cooperative members to a large extent control the broad matters of policy through adoption
of a charter and amendments thereto, election of the chairman and directors, voting on
extraordinary corporate transactions such as mergers, reorganizations, and liquidations, and
deciding questions of admission to membership, employment matters, and distribution of
profits. See Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 14, § 3. The most striking departure
from the U.S. corporate model thus consists of certain planning activities and other managerial
functions that the Soviet law leaves up to the cooperative members rather than to the directors.
76. Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 14, § 2. Although the statute is silent on the
specifics of the voting by members, presumably the charter may require super-majority or
unanimous approval of certain decisions.
77. Id. art. 14, § 2. The employees' right to participate in the general assembly, however,
is limited to the right of an "advisory vote." Id.
78. Id. art. 14, § 3. These enumerated powers of the general assembly are reserved
exclusively to the assembly and cannot be delegated to the board of directors or other
administrative bodies. Additional administrative and managerial powers also may be granted
to the general assembly in accordance with the cooperative charter and pursuant to the decisions
of the general assembly. Id.
79. Id. art. 14, § 4.
80. Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 14, § 4.
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to enter into agreements on behalf of the cooperative, sign contracts
and other official documents, take charge of daily operations, and
implement the policies adopted by the cooperative's members.81 The
audit commission is generally entrusted with auditing the financial,
8 2
accounting, and managerial activities of the cooperative.
The statute does not fix any statutory liabilities for the directors
or chairperson of a cooperative enterprise. The members, however,
have certain obligations to the cooperative. Cooperative members are
obliged to:
(1) comply with the provisions of the cooperative's charter and to
obey the decisions made at the general meetings of the cooperative
membership, or by the elected board of directors or officers;
(2) carry out their respective responsibilities related to employment
status or investment contributions;
(3) participate actively in management of the cooperative's business
affairs; and
(4) safeguard and solidify state and cooperative property and to
prevent waste and inefficient use of such property."3
Other additional obligations of the cooperative members may be
84
provided for in the cooperative charter.
D.

Economic Operations

The Law on Cooperatives states that activities of the Soviet cooperatives are to be based upon the principles of self-financing and
autonomy in the principal areas of their business activities (such as
planning, pricing, distributing profits, corporate finance, borrowing,
supplies, and foreign trade).8 5 Negotiating and entering into contracts
is reserved for the cooperatives' competence and authority alone
without any direct interference by the central authorities.8 6 Considerable freedom to contract for cooperatives also is envisioned and
the contract is declared to be "the single legal and economic document regulating all of the stated commercial and industrial relations"
between cooperatives and third parties. 7 Another indication of a
dramatic shift from a "command economy" to a market-oriented

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id. art. 13, § 2.
Id. art. 13, § 3.
Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 17, § 1.
Id. § 3.
Id.

The TransnationalLawyer / Vol. 2

economy is the legislated notion that monetary damages recovered
in litigation are to be the only compensation for the injured party
rather than an imposition of central plans, quotas, and non-monetary
criminal penalties on the defaulting party. 88 Moreover, profit explicitly
is fixed as one of the criteria of evaluating economic performance,
and activity at a loss is said to be incompatible with the cooperative's
very nature. 89
A critical element in the success of small private business enterprises
in centrally planned economies is independence in business, production, and financial planning. Soviet cooperatives are given the right
to conduct independently all of their planning activities, with all
business plans required to be approved by the cooperative's general
assembly.10 Internal cooperative activities, such as allocation and
distribution of profits, are accomplished on the basis of democratic
methods by the general assembly and any interference from the state
or outside bodies and agencies is forbidden. 91 External activities, such
as investing, marketing, and distributing, also are left up to each
cooperative's management. The statute reiterates the criteria for
sound business planning like a good business textbook, reminding
cooperative management to evaluate market forces, fixed and variable
costs, demand for production, taxes, and labor availability. Even
pricing decisions remain largely unaffected by the state bodies and
directives.92
Nonetheless, cooperatives as autonomous private business entities
cannot operate successfully in a non-market economy without losing
some of their independence. The chief area of concern is obtaining
supplies of raw materials and equipment. Limited supplies in an
economy which is monopolized by state enterprises and rigidly controlled by a single government planning agency (Gosplan) places the
cooperatives in a difficult position. The law anticipates that cooperatives will obtain necessary raw materials and equipment on wholesale terms from state enterprises and other cooperatives. 9 Apart from
agricultural and food supplies, these wholesale markets do not yet
exist. Furthermore, this system of obtaining materials and equipment
88. Id.
89. Id. art. 20, § 1.
90. Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 18, § 1.
91. Id. art. 20.
92. Id. art. 9. Certain goods manufactured from raw materials or components supplied
by the state enterprises from special reserves or goods specifically allocated to the cooperative
by the state must be priced at the centrally set level. Id. art. 9, § 4.
93. Id. art. 27, § 1.
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may be insufficient in view of the constant shortages of essential
items, and the system of preferences and priorities-whereby certain
state organizations are allotted deficit goods and materials by Gosplan,94-all of which certainly will impede the development of successful private companies. The law also provides that the state will
take measures to develop a more efficient market of wholesale
distribution. 95 Some assistance may be found in the interim, however,
in the provision allowing cooperatives to purchase, trade, or lease
and raw
unutilized buildings, machinery, equipment, transportation,
96
organizations.
and
enterprises
state
materials from
Cooperatives also are given the right to borrow funds from banking
institutions and to maintain business accounts. 97 The law specifically
guarantees that cooperative accounts cannot be attached or frozen
without a court decision or arbitrator's decree.98 The law introduces
a number of concepts borrowed from western commercial practices,
such as guarantees, credits, default and the right to stop shipment
on default, security and priority of creditors, and involuntary bankruptcy. In addition to obtaining bank loans, cooperatives may secure
their financial resources from the initial capital contributed by their
members and employees. 99
Additionally, the statute authorizes cooperatives to issue and sell
debt and equity securities.100 Although no securities regulations or
corporate finance law currently exist in the Soviet Union, the statute
provides a few guidelines for issuance of stock and refers to the
federal legislation to be enacted in that area.10 ' Specifically, the law
limits the total price of securities to the annual gross revenues of the
issuer cooperative, provides for the cooperative's assets to serve as
the underlying security for the issued stock, and grants to cooperative
members preferential rights to acquire stock. Par value and the
payment of dividends are to be set by the cooperatives. 02 To issue
securities, a cooperative needs special permission from the local tax
authority in consultation with the USSR State Bank, and an admin-

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See Ioffe, Law and Economy in the USSR, 95 -A{v. L. REv. 1591, 1595-1625 (1982).
Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 27, § 1.
Id. art. 27, § 4.
Id. art. 23, § 1.
Id. art. 23, § 2.
Id.
Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 23, § 2.
Id. art. 22, § 4.
Id.
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istrative refusal to permit issuance of securities may be appealed to
the superior state treasury agency. 10 3
Taxation affects both the business income of the cooperative and
the individual income of its members and employees. The Law on
Cooperatives does not by itself contain provisions related to taxation,
but instead lays down certain basic principles. 1°4 The new tax law
that took effect on April 1, 1988, imposed tax rates of up to 90
percent on private income. After businesses protested that the rate
would stifle new ventures, the Finance Ministry grudgingly agreed to
redraft the law with lower rates.105 No new version has been forthcoming for quite some time and the question of tax rates on cooperative business income is fraught with great uncertainty.
The Law on Cooperatives requires that the system of tax rates
apply different rates to different types of cooperatives. 106 Furthermore, the law guarantees that these tax rates will be fixed for at
least five years. 1' A progressive scale is to be employed and various
waivers and exclusions are to be authorized for cooperatives engaged
in manufacturing essential consumer goods and services. 108 Similarly,
the law provides for tax deductions for charitable purposes. State
tax organizations enforce strict compliance with the law. Forfeitures
and fines are authorized, as well as revocation of a cooperative's
charter if the cooperative repeatedly evades the tax law. 109
One of the most attractive features of the cooperative form of
private business in the Soviet Union is that cooperatives may be
given the right to transact directly with foreign firms. 110 Specifically,
industrial cooperatives may obtain a license to conduct export-import
operations in foreign trade and earn foreign exchange. Foreign trade
is one of the few fields in which cooperatives need explicit official
permission and the press reports that few have received it."'

103. Id.
104. See id. art. 21.
105. See Soviet Foray Into Capitalism Begins to Show a Seamy Side, N.Y. Times, July
25, 1988, at Al, col. 1. As an alternative, leaders of the Soviet cooperative movement proposed
a personal income tax on cooperative members and employees of 20 percent, lower than the
standard rate in most Western economies. See Lloyd, Co-op Tax of 20 Per Cent Proposed,
Fin. Times, Aug. 27, 1988, at 2, col. 5.
106. Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 21, § 2.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. art. 21, § 5.
110. Id. art. 21.
111. Moscow News was quoted as saying that of the 21,548 cooperatives registered on July
5, 1988, only one had been given permission to trade abroad. See Lloyd, supra note 50, at 2,
col. 1.
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The requirement for obtaining official permission was scheduled
to be lifted on April 1, 1989. At that time, all industrial cooperatives
manufacturing goods or providing services saleable in the West were
to receive the right to conduct all export-import transactions directly." 2 Even when most of the legal barriers are removed, Soviet
cooperatives probably will be only a minor participant in the country's foreign trade transactions. One of the reasons for this is that
Western companies, which are in the habit of dealing with foreign
trade organizations and other government ministries, and therefore
are accustomed to the predictable approaches taken by Soviet officials
during negotiations and deal-making, may be wary of dealing with
small, unregulated cooperatives. Since the Soviet government apparently has never defaulted on contractual obligations, private cooperatives introduce a fair degree of commercial risk into doing business
in the USSR, which often may outweigh the cooperative's advantages
in flexibility and adaptability.
The statute particularly encourages cooperatives which stimulate
technological and scientific progress, and authorizes the cooperatives
to exchange information and expertise with scientific institutes and
technological complexes of the state sector." 3 Therefore, high technology production and research cooperatives indeed may be expected
to contribute substantially. Presently, Soviet exports to the West are
mostly confined to energy products, natural resources, raw materials,
and heavy machinery. The country's reservoir of scientific talent
holds great promise. Major areas (e.g., engineering, physics, biology,
and chemistry, and their countless specialties) are developed to the
highest international standards in a country which boasts one of the
largest concentrations of research institutes.1 4 Until now, most of
this talent has benefitted the Soviet military. Today, there are indications only that some of those facilities and talents have been freed
for commercial ventures by the cooperative sector exploiting technological innovations." 5 If the state allows open access to its best
research and production facilities, the export of high technology
(albeit perhaps not in the form of finished goods but rather in a
way of inventions, patents, and consulting activities) has a chance
112. See SP SSSR, No. 1405 (Dec. 2, 1988), (reprinted in Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta No.
51, Dec. 16, 1988).
113. See Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 26.
114. See Galuszka, supra note 52, at 68-78.
115. See Greenberger, West Shops for Marketable Technology Createdby the Soviet Union's
Scientists, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1988, at All, col. 3.
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of becoming a lucrative area of Soviet exports and a burgeoning
field for cooperative business development.
CONCLUSION

Whether the cooperative movement in the USSR will grow fast

enough and gain enough strength to become a vital player in the
Soviet economy remains uncertain. Soviet citizens certainly have
displayed unusual eagerness to participate in this trend toward pri-

vatization. More than 30,000 cooperatives have been registered to
date, and the pace is quickening." 6 The real test of economic reform,
however, depends upon to what extent these ventures into the capitalist market system will be tolerated by local governments. Moscow
has bestowed legitimacy on the cooperative movement through the

grant of extensive legal rights and privileges. Enforcement of these
rights and privileges, previously enjoyed exclusively by governmental

institutions, is another matter and may prove problematic for the
reform leaders. Nevertheless, the step toward decentralization and

privatization has been taken, with a conscious decision to profit from
the experience of other non-market systems (such as the People's

Republic of China, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, where similar experiments have had limited success) while avoiding the pitfalls encoun117
tered in those countries.
In light of the practical and ideological difficulties facing Soviet
cooperatives, the fate of the cooperative movement in the USSR also

remains uncertain. As the first entrant in the Soviet private economic
sector, the cooperative is extremely important to the whole economic

restructuring plan of Gorbachev. The waves of industrial reform
appear to promise more in a way of privatization, such as plans to
116. In the twelve-month period beginning July 1987, the total number of co-ops in the
Soviet Union grew from 3,709 to 32,561, and their total revenues increased from 29.2 million
roubles to 1.04 billion roubles. See Lloyd, supra note 50, at 2, col. 1.
117. Interestingly, according to two of Gorbachev's most important economic reformers,
academicians Leonid Abalkin and Abel Aganbegyan, the Soviet leader may have recently
turned to Sweden as a role model in his task of restructuring the Soviet economy. Sweden
was reportedly selected for its high living standards, low unemployment rate, and lack of
poverty, (i.e., its status as one of the few countries in the world with high levels of economic
efficiency and social justice). Hungary, on the other hand, has fallen on hard times with its
huge foreign debt, reduced competitiveness, and decreased standard of living. China and
Yugoslavia have also encountered inflation and unemployment. In addition to Sweden's large
public business sector, highly unionized work force and high taxes, the Soviets are also attracted
by the Swedish experience with participatory management, employee training, and the cooperative movement-all of which may be easily adopted into the Soviet economy and its sociopolitical thinking. See When in Russia, Do As the Swedes Do, Christian Sci. Monitor, June
27, 1988, at 12, col. I .
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allow wide shareholding of the state industrial and agricultural enterprises. 1 8 There is also talk of special economic zones for foreign
investment offering additional incentives and liberal regulation, and
of plans to make Soviet currency fully convertible on international
capital markets.11 9 The success of the cooperative as a vital player in
the domestic economy and foreign trade operations, however, proves
essential for the introduction of further, more radical reforms tending
toward a free-market economy in the USSR. Without a more flexible
and profit-driven private sector in the Soviet Union, ambitious macroeconomic plans stand little chance of being realized.
To date, no Western firms have entered into joint ventures or
trade agreements with Soviet nongovernmental cooperative enterprises. The advantages of doing so, nonetheless, may prove sizeable
enough to warrant attention to this fledgling sector of Soviet economy. Better product quality, as a result of the direct pecuniary
interest of both employees and members of the cooperative, and
greater flexibility in marketing and distributing goods and services to
the end-users should make trade and joint ventures with Soviet
cooperatives attractive to Western companies.

118. See
28, 1988, at
119. See
Wall St. J.,

Peel, Soviet Union Plans to Sell Shares in Industry and Farms, Fin. Times, Oct.
1, col. 3.
Gumbel, Soviets to Devalue Ruble by 50%, Alter Tariffs to Boost Economy,
Dec. 21, 1988, at 1, col. 1.

